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Abstract 
 
It is observed that merger premiums vary across countries. In this paper we study the impact 
of country-level characteristics on cross-border merger and acquisition premiums. By using 
principal component analysis to combine several existing country-level indices, we provide 
empirical evidence that stronger measures of legal and regulatory standards, investor protection, 
and corporate transparency lead to higher merger premiums in cross-border transactions. The 
results indicate that managers of the acquiring firm are willing to pay a higher premium to 
acquire a foreign target when they believe the risks of achieving merger synergies are lower, and 
that the market for corporate control is not an effective substitute for a formal legal and 
regulatory system that protects shareholders.  
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1. Introduction 
Our world becomes increasingly interconnected through the globalization of information, 
trade, and capital markets. One result of the growing interconnectedness is the ability, 
willingness, and even desire for companies to pursue inorganic growth strategies in foreign 
markets. This observation is not new, and several scholars theorize how and why this occurs. 
The explanations range from behavioral theories whereby management recognizes market 
mispricing to neoclassical explanations in which industry shocks drive merger waves (Nelson, 
1959; Gort, 1969; Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Rhodes-Kropf and 
Vishwanathan, 2004; Harford, 2005). Despite the range of possible explanations, the data 
suggests that cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) occur frequently and are even 
becoming an increasingly important component of global capital markets and finance. Figure 1 
illustrates the recent waves of M&A activity, both domestic and cross-border, that occur over 
time. Based on this data, cross-border transactions are increasing as both a percentage of the total 
number of deals, as well as the total value of transactions. As a result of this increasingly 
important role for cross-border M&A in the global market place, we provide additional insights 
into the effect of country-level characteristics on corporate valuation, and on cross-border M&A 
premiums, specifically.  
 
[Insert Figure 1: Historical Domestic and Cross-border M&A] 
 
Despite the voluminous work on the drivers of cross-border M&A and foreign direct 
investment (FDI), comparatively less literature has investigated cross-border M&A premiums. 
We view this gap in the literature as an opportunity to study the clear differences in merger 
premiums across countries. Merger premiums are, and have been, heavily scrutinized by 
shareholders, academics, financial pundits and other stakeholders. Premiums have come under 
scrutiny because shareholders from both the acquirer and the target want management to act in 
the best interests of the respective shareholders.1 Naturally, target shareholders want to maximize 
the premium, whereas acquirer shareholders want to minimize it. The decision by management 
to undertake M&A can have meaningful implications for shareholders, and while the popularity 
                                            
1 See Jensen and Meckling (1986) 
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for inorganic growth has increased over time, there remains healthy skepticism that M&A creates 
lasting shareholder value in many cases. By definition, cross-border M&A involves additional 
complexity relative to domestic M&A due to considerable differences across countries. The 
notable variation in legal, regulatory, and governance characteristics as well as merger premiums 
across countries allows us to investigate whether variation in country-level characteristics, 
particularly those related to the investment environment, explain the variation we observe in 
cross-border M&A premiums. We indeed find that stronger target country-level legal and 
regulatory standards as well as improved corporate governance leads to higher merger premiums. 
 
Much of the relevant literature that provides the foundation for this study is owed, at least in 
part, to the thoughtful works of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny. These authors 
published several works in the 1990s and 2000s studying the effects of country-level legal and 
regulatory standards and their impact on corporate governance, valuation, and the broader capital 
markets. The key country-level variables include differences in legal origins (La Porta et al., 
1998), rule of law (La Porta et al., 1997; La Porta et al., 1998), judicial efficiency (La Porta et 
al., 1997; La Porta et al., 1998; La Porta et al., 2000a; La Porta et al., 2000b; La Porta et al., 
2002), ownership concentration (La Porta et al., 1998), and investor protection (La Porta et al., 
2002). And yet, despite this proliferation of “law and finance” literature, no study has yet to 
investigate how these issues relate to cross-border M&A premiums.2 Additionally, one issue that 
many researchers in this area encounter is the highly correlated nature of many country-level 
variables. The high correlation among these variables is due, in large part, to the endogenous 
environment in which they develop (within an individual country). To remedy the issue of 
endogeneity, La Porta et al. (1998) propose the use of a country’s legal origins, as a proxy for 
the strength of a country’s legal and regulatory system and investor protection standards. The 
authors go on to use legal origins to explain growth and development of a country’s capital 
markets. The legal origin of a country is largely exogenous to other variables and represents 
many legal and regulatory characteristics that both foreign and domestic investors are concerned 
about. This methodology is theoretically sound, however there remain many other institutional 
characteristics that impact investor decision making as well. As a result of the endogenous and 
                                            
2 It is important here to note that the indices used by La Porta et al. have been developed by both the authors and various other 
sources. These indices are used as proxies for institutional standards and are by definition not objective measures 
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highly correlated nature of many other country-level variables, an empirical result indicating that 
better legal enforcement is correlated with higher stock market valuations may in fact be 
capturing the impact of better accounting standards, or less risk of forced government 
expropriation, etc. We propose a new measure of a country’s investment environment to deal 
with the strong correlation between country-level variables, while still addressing the risk-related 
concerns of investors. We thereby postulate a positive relation between the target’s investment 
environment index and the premium paid in cross-border M&A deals.  
 
For illustrative purposes, the question we explore can be understood by the following 
example: Suppose a UK company (Company A) is looking to acquire one of two target 
companies, Company B (located in Canada), or Company C (located in France). The acquirer 
would expect the current market value of each company to accurately reflect the underlying 
country-level environment in which each company is domiciled.3 Assuming that both businesses 
are virtually identical with the exception of where they are located, the acquirer would then turn 
their attention to the potential synergies that could result from combining their business, with 
either Company B or Company C. Assume the concept of synergies is not relevant to the acquirer 
until after they consider the transaction. Prior to announcement of a transaction, the target 
company’s share price will not reflect the full value of a transaction premium due to the 
uncertainty that a transaction will occur. Once a merger announcement is made however, the 
target’s share price should quickly reflect the new expected value of the firm, which in turn 
should reflect at least a fraction of the expected value of the synergies to be achieved. Assuming 
again that Company B and Company C are identical apart from their geographic locations, the 
difference in value attributable to potential synergies that would be achieved by acquiring either 
of the targets should be at least partially explained by the differences in each target’s country-
level characteristics. To explain this another way, the premium that the acquiring firm pays to 
target shareholders should be at least partially explained by the level confidence that 
management has in their ability to achieve the anticipated synergies. Management’s level of 
confidence then, should be driven, at least in part, by their perception of the underlying risks 
associated with the target country. We contend that when target countries have stronger legal, 
regulatory and corporate governance functions, management of the acquiring firm are more 
                                            
3 As per Fama’s (1970) Efficient Market Hypothesis 
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likely to feel as if their rights are systematically protected and there is less risk in making an 
investment. As a result, the acquiring firm’s management will discount the expected cash flows 
of the target at a lower rate and therefore be willing to pay a higher premium. This argument is 
an extension of the argument put forth by La Porta et al. (2002) and Bhattacharya and Daouk 
(2002) whereby better investor protection leads to a lower cost of capital as investors are more 
willing to part with their capital. This argument is supported by Lombardo and Pagano (2000), 
who find evidence that legal standards and judicial efficiency are positively associated with the 
risk-adjusted return on equity – or rather, there is a premium associated with better institutions. 
It is further supported by the findings of Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), who show that 
firms in countries with better functioning institutions have superior cost of capital and valuations. 
 
The motivation of this paper is twofold. First, several studies recognize and explore 
differences in legal and regulatory standards across countries. We want to add a new perspective 
on how country-level investment characteristics affect corporate valuation in cross-border M&A 
by studying their relation to merger premiums. Merger premiums also vary by country, and we 
expect that some of that variation is explained by country-level investment characteristics. 
Second, we want to address the common issue of collinearity that is associated with country-
level investment variables and, in doing so, propose a new proxy measure of legal and regulatory 
standards, corporate governance, and transparency. To address the issue of collinearity we use 
principal component analysis to create a new index to represent the target country’s investment 
environment that combines several theoretically and empirically robust proxies for legal, 
regulatory and investor protection characteristics. Using a sample of 1,864 cross-border M&A 
transactions we analyze the relation between the target country’s investment environment index 
and the premium paid in cross-border transactions. We argue that when there is less perceived 
risk associated with targets, acquirers are willing to pay a higher premium, and we find that the 
premium is higher for targets in countries with a better investment environment. We also find 
evidence that acquirers are willing to pay more to acquire greater control of foreign assets and 
that larger deals, as measured by a target’s total assets, are associated with lower premiums. Our 
findings provide another compelling argument for improved legal and regulatory standards, 
corporate governance, and corporate transparency.  
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2, the literature review, will provide a 
review of the existing literature and provide a conceptual framework from which to better 
understand the study. Section 3 describes the data that is used in the study as well as some of the 
benefits and limitations of using this data. Section 4 provides an overview of the unique 
methodology used in the study and further analyzes the benefits and limitations of the chosen 
methodology. Section 5 presents and discusses the empirical results and Section 6 summarizes 
and concludes the paper.  
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
The purpose of this section is twofold. The first is to introduce the existing relevant literature. 
The second is to provide a theoretical framework for the rationale of our investment environment 
index as well as the results and implications of the empirical work that follows.  
 
2.1 Mergers & Acquisitions 
We begin looking at some of the existing literature related to M&A. The neoclassical theory 
suggests that M&A broadly improves efficiency and provides productivity gains for acquirers 
by allowing them to achieve synergies related to acquisitions (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; 
Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2001; Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002; Damodaran, 2005). Shleifer and 
Vishny (2003) suggest another theory, related to the neoclassical explanation, whereby M&A 
transactions are driven by the stock market valuations of the merging firms and where 
managerial behavior is a central feature. The concept of managerial behavior is a remarkably 
important component to understanding why managers pursue M&A and there are predominantly 
two ways to think about it. The first is that managers make good investment decisions that benefit 
shareholders. The second is that managers make bad investment decisions that do not reflect the 
best interests of shareholders (often times for personal gain). Jensen and Meckling (1976)’s 
agency theory complements the latter argument by suggesting that owner and manager interests 
diverge somewhat from those of other shareholders, such that they pursue personal utility-
maximizing policies, sometimes at the expense of minority investors and other capital providers.  
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To address the issue of agency costs in more detail, an agency problem is created when a 
minority shareholder (principal) provides capital to management (agent) with the implicit 
understanding that the agent will act on the principal’s behalf and with the principal’s best 
interests in mind. Naturally, as Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose, management may be more 
inclined to award themselves perquisites or pursue non-value maximizing acquisitions that 
unfairly benefit themselves. This divergence of interests poses a major challenge to the “trust” 
element of the principal-agent relationship. Acting in their own personal interest can lead 
managers to pursue value-destroying acquisitions. For example, managers may seek to invest in 
a business that is most valuable under their leadership, thereby entrenching themselves in the 
firm (Jensen, 1986; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Morck et al., (1990). We refer to management 
entrenchment via the pursuit of value-destroying acquisitions as empire building. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1988, p. 13) states, “Acquisitions, especially friendly ones, may provide managers with 
their greatest opportunity for expressing their non-value-maximizing preferences.” And so, to 
address the risk posed by managerial behavior and the agency relationship, firms have 
established corporate governance regimes that are designed to monitor management and protect 
shareholders from management who wish to pursue non-value maximizing acquisitions. These 
corporate governance systems are often established with the prevailing legal and regulatory 
standards in mind.  
 
The M&A process is further complicated by the presence of information asymmetry between 
the managers of target and acquirer firms. That is, each manager is tasked with acting in their 
shareholders’ best interests, and yet management from the target firm have access to much better 
information about their company’s true worth than management from the acquiring firm. This 
presents the possibility of an adverse selection problem for the acquiring firm’s management. 
As Akerlof (1970) puts it, the adverse selection problem arises out of the rational thinking that a 
manager may be purchasing a lemon.4 We return to the concept of adverse selection and lemons 
later in the study; however, these two challenging issues, agency costs and information 
asymmetry, reduce the capital markets’ ability to effectively allocate capital, assets, and 
ownership by allowing insiders to expropriate wealth from outside investors. 
 
                                            
4 Akerlof (1970) uses the illustrative example of the market for used cars to explain the problem of adverse selection.  
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Despite the challenges, M&A continues to remain a viable and heavily practiced growth 
strategy. According to Harford (2005) and Lipton (2006) M&A occurs in waves and each wave 
is can be defined by a concentration of the type of merger. For example, the early 1900s were 
associated with mergers for monopolistic power, this wave led to anti-monopolistic fears and 
eventually led to antitrust law in the US. The 1920s were associated with vertical mergers, paving 
the way for a new type of firm called conglomerates, this wave of transactions was unofficially 
ended by the great depression although appeared again in the 1960s. The 1980s were 
characterized by the breakup of many of these conglomerates by corporate raiders due to the 
inefficient nature of their multiple business verticals and lack of operational focus. The nature 
of this wave paved the way for the theory of the market corporate control (Jensen and Ruback, 
1983; Scharfstein, 1988; Jensen, 1993). The 1990s saw another wave of mergers for scale, 
primarily driven by the deregulation of some markets (most notably the utilities industry) and 
the privatization of others (most notably the telecommunications industry).  
 
2.2 Cross-border Mergers & Acquisitions 
Commensurate with the rise of globalization and deregulation, cross-border M&A has 
become increasingly prevalent. The drivers and implications of cross-border M&A are largely 
similar to domestic M&A however cross-border deals, by definition, involve more variables, 
which leads to additional complexity, uncertainty, and the potential for substantially greater 
risks. According to Erel et al. (2012), “National borders add an extra element to the calculus of 
domestic mergers because they are associated with an additional set of frictions that can impede 
or facilitate mergers”. Erel et al. (2012) also find that in a sample of 56,978 cross-border deals 
between 1990 and 2007, factors such as geography (proximity of the target and acquirer), 
currency movements, bilateral trade, and relative stock market valuations are associated with a 
greater likelihood of cross-border M&A. 
At a more macroeconomic level, firms on aggregate are also subject to country-level 
mechanisms such as judicial efficiency, rule of law, securities regulations and accounting 
standards, which all seek to provide a framework within which the firms in an economy can 
operate effectively. Intuitively then, the extent to which these country-level mechanisms are 
successful is dependent upon the level by which they are enforced. La Porta et al. (1997) propose 
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that stronger laws (and their effective enforcement) protecting shareholders (and creditors) from 
expropriation by insiders leads to more efficient capital markets (capital allocation). Taking it 
one step further, many studies go on to suggest that the efficiency of the capital markets can play 
an important role in driving economic growth by funneling capital towards its most efficient use 
(Schumpeter, 1934; King and Levine, 1993; Beck et al., 2000). M&A is one channel by which 
capital markets aim to funnel capital towards its most efficient use by re-allocating management 
and ownership of assets and cash flows. Cross-border M&A then, is the natural progression of 
the search for growth in global capital markets.  
As an extension to these prior findings, we expect countries that systematically facilitate 
stronger levels of corporate governance, legal and regulatory protection, and investor confidence 
to have firms that are more highly valued. Rossi and Volpin (2004) observe that acquirers tend 
to be from countries with better investor protection while targets are typically from countries 
with weaker investor protection. One explanation for this finding is that when investors have 
more rights and those rights are better protected, they are less likely to be expropriated by 
management and, consistent with La Porta et al., (2002) and Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002), 
this makes raising external equity to fund acquisitions less expensive (lower cost of capital).5 
Conversely, in countries with weaker investor protection, management is more likely to be 
entrenched, and as a result, the cost of capital is expected to be higher (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1989). Bebchuk (1999) and Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) find that entrenchment in US firms (as 
measured by firms with staggered boards), is associated with meaningfully lower firm value (as 
measured by Tobin’s Q). Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) also find that the relation between 
entrenchment and firm value is stronger when staggered boards are mandated in a firm’s charter, 
which shareholders have no ability to amend versus when it is established in the firm’s bylaws 
which can be easily amended. This would suggest that the underlying legal and regulatory 
environment in which a firm is governed, as well as the enforcement of those rules, affects the 
value an investor is willing to attribute to a firm. On an international scale, La Porta et al. (1999) 
find that in a sample of 371 large corporations in 27 wealthy countries, economies with weak 
investor protection tend to have high ownership concentration (usually by controlling families 
or the state) and controlling shareholders have power over the firm well in excess of their cash 
                                            
5 This same reasoning can be used with creditor protection; however, we focus exclusively on shareholder protection 
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flow rights (i.e. their pro-rata share of common equity). Additionally, Haidar (2009) finds that 
investor protection, as measured by the Anti-self-dealing index per Djankov et al. (2008), is 
useful in explaining cross-country differences in long-term economic growth and that the 
relations is stronger in lower-income countries where external capital is in higher demand.6  
 
These findings have not been ignored as we continue to see regulators and decision-makers 
around the world rejigging their legal and regulatory policies to facilitate improved governance 
standards and investor protection. Despite the largely collective desire for these standards to 
improve globally, clear differences remain across countries.  
 
One complication in assessing the impact of corporate governance and investor protection 
on firm value is that there is no clearly defined, ideal measure for either. There is, however, an 
understanding that when an investor purchases securities, they are purchasing specific rights. 
These rights may include the right to receive dividends, to vote for or against directors, to 
participate in new issues on the same terms as insiders, or the right to certain assets in the event 
a firm fails to make a contractual interest payment, etc. Historically, researchers have tried to 
create proxies for corporate governance and investor protection based on specific mechanisms 
that either enhance or detract from an investor’s ability to exercise their contractual rights. These 
proxies have included indices such as the Accounting Standards Index, Legal Origin and Rule 
of Law Index, Anti-director Rights Index, and the Anti-self-dealing Index.7,8 
In arguably one of the most recognized papers exploring cross-country variation and 
corporate finance, La Porta et al. (1998) find that when used as a proxy for investor protection, 
a country’s legal origin can partially explain the level of financial development in a country.9 
One very attractive empirical feature of using legal origin as a proxy for investor protection is 
that it is truly exogenous to other variables, while also highly correlated with other related 
                                            
6 Haidar (2009) uses a measure provided by the World Bank called the Investor Protection Index (IPI) which is an updated 
measure of the Anti-self-dealing index proposed by Djankov et al. (2008) 
7 The Anti-self-dealing index is an index created by Djankov et al. (2008) that represents the legal protection of minority 
shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders (developed in conjunction with Lex Mundi law firms); it is discussed 
in more detail in the Data section below 
8 The Anti-director rights is an index created by La Porta et al. (1998) that represents shareholders rights with respect to 
management; it is discussed in more detail in the Data section below 
9 The use of financial development here can take several meanings however recent literature has shown better legal protection 
of shareholders is associated with more developed markets (La Porta et al., 1997), lower ownership concentration (La Porta et 
al., 1999), higher dividend payouts (La Porta et al., 2000b), and higher corporate valuation (La Porta et al., 2002).  
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measures.10 At a high level there are two families of law including: (1) common law (based on 
English law) and, (2) civil law, which is comprised of three sub-families including French, 
German and Scandinavian law.11 In practice the two families are very different. Common law 
relies on precedent judicial decisions, or the doctrine of stare decisis, which is the principle of 
establishing litigious merit based on precedent decisions. These principles are typically guided 
by established legislation and statutes; however in their absence the system relies on natural 
reasoning, fairness and an innate sense of justice. In civil law however, only legislative 
enactments are considered to be legally binding and a person whose actions do not specifically 
breach these codes should not expect to receive an unfavorable ruling.  
The distinction between these two legal families is important because investors have an 
inherent sense that in exchange for upfront capital they will receive cash flow rights or dividends 
(as well as voting rights in the case of common equity securities, or collateral rights in the case 
of debt securities). This inherent sense of understanding is merited only if the prevailing legal 
system will act appropriately, as the ultimate arbitrator, in the event that management does not 
honor the contract. As a result, investors are more willing to provide capital when they believe 
their rights are more strongly protected. La Porta et al. (1998) state that “since the protection 
investors receive determines their readiness to finance firms, corporate finance may critically 
turn on these legal rules and their enforcement”.  
A discussion on the effects of legal origins and investor protection on capital market 
development without addressing the enforcement of those laws would be incomplete. Although 
a country’s legal framework is critical to facilitate investor confidence, the enforcement of such 
laws is also vitally important. In practice, there exists a trade-off, as noted by Hay (1994), 
whereby it is not theoretically obvious whether stricter laws or more flexible laws are more 
favorable to investors. Hay et al. (1996) suggests that if courts were able to consistently enforce 
contracts appropriately, then flexible and situational laws would likely be preferable; however, 
since enforcement is largely imperfect, clearly defined laws that provide little “gray area” may 
be preferable. This point of view regarding the importance of enforcement is shared by Stigler 
(1964) and Easterbrook and Fischel (1991). 
                                            
10 As discussed throughout this paper, other country-level variables are highly correlated and most often endogenous 
11 To some extent Chinese law combines civil law and socialist law as practiced in the People’s Republic of China 
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Not coincidentally, La Porta et al. (1998) demonstrate that not only do legal rules vary across 
countries, but the level of enforcement of those laws varies as well. They find that country’s 
based on German and Scandinavian law have the strongest levels of legal enforcement (however 
common law countries have strong enforcement as well), and French civil law countries have 
the weakest levels of enforcement. Similarly, the quality of legal enforcement is strongly 
correlated with a country’s level of income, and even after controlling for per capita income, 
legal origin continues to be indicative of the level of legal enforcement. As one would expect, 
rule of law and legal enforcement are highly correlated, however cross-country variability still 
exists. From an investor standpoint, it is vital to consider both the law and its enforcement when 
assessing the legal and regulatory environment in which a company is domiciled. Starks and Wei 
(2013) propose that despite the high correlation between these variables, it is important to include 
both as they measure different institutional characteristics. 
As discussed earlier, accounting standards are used as a measure of the disclosure 
requirements a company must provide to investors. For investors to make informed decisions 
about potential investments they require information related to the performance of the business. 
Once an investor has provided capital to an entrepreneur, they will seek to be routinely informed 
on the performance of their investment to ensure their capital is being used appropriately, and to 
benchmark their investments versus other potential investments. As a result of the agency 
relationship between management and shareholders, in the absence of adequate reporting 
standards, management may be free to use corporate funds in a way that is not in the best interest 
of the capital providers. Furthermore, an acquirer in pursuit of an M&A target will rely on 
historical financials and future projections to value the potential benefits of combining the two 
businesses. All else equal, when accounting standards are lower, information asymmetry is 
higher, and when accounting standards are higher, information asymmetry is lower. 
Interestingly, Rossi and Volpin (2004) and Erel et al. (2012) find that accounting standards are 
positively and significantly correlated with cross-border M&A volume. The study shows that a 
12-point increase in accounting standards (the difference between accounting standards in Italy 
and Canada) correlates with a 5% increase in the volume of M&A. The authors find similar 
results, although not as significant, with investor protection. We interpret this association 
between accounting standards and M&A volume as increased disclosure and transparency 
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leading to reduced bid-ask spreads between buyers and sellers as well as lower information 
asymmetry.  
 
2.3 Merger & Acquisition Premiums 
The most traditional definition suggests that the premium to effectuate an M&A trade 
represents the benefit of having control of the target’s assets and the synergies that can be 
realized by the resulting efficiency gains created by combining the two firms that would 
otherwise not be available (Jensen, 1986; Grossman and Hart, 1986; Bradley et al., 1988; Black, 
1989). There remains considerable debate around whether takeovers actually produce real 
efficiency gains, with various studies finding both supportive and unsupportive arguments. For 
example, in a sample of 233 M&A trades, Meeks (1977) finds the return on assets (ROA) for 
acquiring firms in the UK declines consistently in post-merger years. Healy et al. (1992) find 
that in the 50 largest US M&A transactions, the combined firms showed significant abnormal 
improvements in asset productivity, but no significant abnormal increase in operating cash flow 
margins. In another study, Healy et al. (1997) find that for the 50 largest US M&A transactions, 
the operating cash flow returns as a result of the merger met but did not exceed the premium 
paid, making large M&A transactions a net neutral activity from a value standpoint. In a more 
recent study, Blonigen and Pierce (2015) find significant evidence of increased market power 
(as measured by product markups), however they find no evidence of any increase in plant-level 
productivity. Further, the authors find that the differences in markups tend to overstate the effects 
of mergers on traditional revenue productivity measures.  
Regardless of whether real efficiency gains are created through M&A, target company 
management will require a premium to the existing share price for two main reasons. First, target 
company management will require a premium to give up control of their assets.12 Second, to 
encourage support of the transaction, the acquirer must provide incentive for shareholders. Once 
we establish that premiums are required to takeover firms, the next logical question is, “how 
much of a premium should we pay”? Several studies examine the determinants of merger 
premiums and historically, the research has focused on firm and deal-level characteristics. 
                                            
12 It is unlikely that target management would move forward with the combined firm (particularly in transactions involving a 
change in control) 
  13   
 
Sonenshine and Reynolds (2013) suggest that the premium paid in a particular cross-border deal 
should be indicative of the extent to which management can evaluate the synergies. In analyzing 
firm and deal-level characteristics, they find the percentage of shares being acquired to be 
positively correlated with deal premium and that the effect is increasingly prevalent in emerging 
markets. They also find that the ownership acquired is increasingly important when the target 
has higher levels of intangibles assets (such as patents, intellectual property, and goodwill). 
Alexandridis et al. (2007) and Alexandridis et al. (2013) find that acquirer’s pay significantly 
lower premiums for larger targets. One explanation provided by the authors is that as a result of 
target size, the post-merger integration process is more complex and the transactions often fail 
to yield the assumed pre-transaction synergies. An additional explanation is that there is 
inherently less competition for larger firms as there are fewer firms that could practically pursue 
an acquisition. Further, due once again to the increased complexity of larger businesses, 
Alexandridis et al. (2007) go on to show that investors perceive these deals as more uncertain 
and hence result in lower premiums. Donker and Zahir (2008) find that bid premiums are 
negatively associated with ownership concentration, providing empirical support for the 
theoretical takeover models that propose a negative relations between corporate valuation and 
ownership concentration.  
It is commonly understood that firms with better corporate governance tend to command 
higher valuations, resulting in a lower costs of capital (La Porta et al., 2002; Bhattacharya and 
Daouk, 2002; Gompers et al., 2003).13 For example, Gompers et al. (2003) find that US firms 
with stronger shareholder rights have higher firm value, higher profits as well as positive and 
statistically significant abnormal returns. Building on Gompers et al. (2003), Bebchuk and Cohen 
(2008) find that US firms that have low entrenchment scores are associated with positive and 
statistically significant abnormal returns14. Similarly, Daines (2001) finds evidence in the US 
that firms incorporated in Delaware, a state largely believed to be the most protective of investor 
rights, have higher valuations than firms incorporated in other US states. These studies 
demonstrate that corporate governance and investor protection are important considerations for 
                                            
13 Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) find that in countries where insider trading laws are enforced the cost of equity for a country 
is reduced (improved) by 5% 
14 Bebchuk and Cohen (2008) create an index composed of six provisions: (1) staggered boards, (2) limits to shareholder bylaw 
amendments, (3) poison pills, (4) golden parachutes, (5) supermajority requirements for charter amendments, (6) supermajority 
requirements for mergers, to measure the level of entrenchment that is present at a given firm  
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corporate valuation. In terms of cross-border M&A, the answer is not as clear. One way to 
interpret these findings is to consider that the private benefits of control are higher in countries 
with poorer corporate governance and investor protection standards. As an acquiring firm, the 
ability to integrate the target post-transaction close may be more difficult in an environment in 
which insiders have systematically abused their position.  
If insiders can systematically expropriate value from outside investors, their willingness to 
contribute capital is more limited. As a result, at the firm level, managers are often subject to 
both internal and external mechanisms that incentivize them to act in the best interest of 
shareholders. For example, Fama and Jensen (1983) propose that the board of directors provides 
a form of internal control while Scharfstein (1988) and Jensen and Ruback (1983) suggest that 
the market for corporate control plays an external role in shaping management decision making 
by rewarding good management and punishing weak management. Cremers and Nair (2005) 
find evidence that both internal (board of directors, etc.) and external (market for corporate 
control) are complementary in nature as well as associated with positive long-term abnormal 
returns and higher firm valuation as measured by Tobin’s Q. Comment and Schwert (1995) find 
that takeover premiums are higher when the target firm has adopted a poison pill right or when 
it is protected by state laws. This finding also suggests that both internal and external 
mechanisms impact the takeover premium.  
 
2.4 Cross-border Merger & Acquisition Premiums 
In the study most closely related to ours, Rossi and Volpin (2004) find that in a sample of 
4007 M&A transactions representing 35 target countries, takeover premiums are higher in 
countries with higher levels of investor protection and higher accounting standards.15 The 
authors also find that larger deals are associated with lower premiums. At the deal-level, Rossi 
and Volpin (2004) find that dummy variables for cross-border, hostile bid, tender offer, and 
contested bid are all positively related to target premium, with cross-border, tender offer, and 
contested bid being significant at the 10%, 1% and 5%, respectively. Interestingly, they do not 
                                            
15 The authors use a proxy for investor protection computed as the product of the rule of law index and the anti-director rights 
index divided by 10. The values range from zero to six with zero representing the weakest levels of investor protection and six 
representing the strongest levels of investor protection. As described later, we construct a similar measurement of investor 
protection using the product of rule of law and the anti-self-dealing index divided by 10 
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find the hostile bid dummy significant, consistent with Schwert (2000). To test whether the 
premium measures the private benefits of control, Rossi and Volpin (2004) control for the 
difference in acquirer and target shareholder protection and find the result insignificant. The 
interpretation of this finding presumes that the premium is not a proxy for the private benefits of 
control and that managers are not willing to pay a higher premium for personal gains. Further, 
this finding suggests that the premium represents the expected gain available to all shareholders. 
That is, managers of the acquiring firm are confident that they will achieve the expected 
efficiency gains and that in doing so they can compensate target shareholders with the premium 
without overpaying.  
Starks and Wei (2013) find that the takeover premium in cross-border M&A is negatively 
and significantly correlated with the quality of the acquirer’s country-level corporate governance 
regime, particularly when the method of consideration is stock. The authors suggest that foreign 
acquirers compensate target firm shareholders for exposing them to inferior accounting 
standards. Using several proxies for investor protection and corporate governance, this study 
focuses on a sample of domestic and cross-border deals involving only US targets. The authors 
suggest that foreign bidders need to compensate target firm shareholders for the exposure to 
higher corporate governance risks. One key assumption the authors make is that the US has the 
highest level of corporate governance; and that in any acquisition of a US target, the investment 
risk profile for the existing US investors is increased. One plausible explanation here is that US 
institutional investors are hesitant to accept stock as consideration due to the frictions associated 
with owning foreign securities (despite the tax advantages of stock transactions). Furthermore, 
the assumption that the US has the highest levels of corporate governance is highly contestable 
and it may be such that higher premiums are just a feature of US targets, which would be 
consistent with Rossi and Volpin’s (2004) findings. However, the key takeaway from Starks and 
Wei (2013) is that investors attribute value to superior corporate governance regimes and that in 
countries where superior governance regimes are systematically facilitated, on average, firms 
will command higher merger premiums.  
Weitzel and Berns (2006) find in a study of 4,979 cross-border and domestic takeovers that 
a one-point decrease (on a 10 point scale) in the target country’s corruption index is associated 
with a decrease in the premium paid of 21%. Although they do not find corruption to be a 
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significant deterrent to cross-border M&A, they do find that increased corruption represents an 
increased risk to buyers. As a result, the discount applied to the business is greater. Sonenshine 
and Reynolds (2013) find evidence that suggests firms will pay a higher premium to acquire 
greater control over a foreign firm’s assets, and this relation is even stronger when the target is 
in a developing country. 
2.5 Hypothesis Development 
Following the literature review, it should be clear that cross-border M&A involves 
additional complexity and risks, due to the foreign nature of the target company, which results 
in differences in investment characteristics between acquirer and target. It follows then that the 
acquiring firm’s management may be willing to pay a higher premium for targets located in 
countries that systematically reduce those risks. As noted, a country has several means by 
which to systematically reduce investment risks, however this paper focuses on the legal, 
regulatory and corporate governance avenues. Therefore, we formulate the following testable 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis:  The premium paid to effectuate cross-border M&A transactions will be 
positively associated with the target country’s investment environment 
index   
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3. Data 
Our sample includes 1,952 cross-border M&A transactions involving targets from 63 
countries and acquirers from 74 countries with a transaction size greater than US$25 million16. 
After analyzing our M&A data, we find transactions with targets in 41 of the 49 countries with 
available data (which accounts for 96.1% of the original sample), leaving 1,864 transactions. 
The sample data is acquired from two main sources; the M&A deal level data is from SDC 
Platinum and the country-level data is obtained from the website of Rafael La Porta.17,18 The 
M&A data contains all cross-border mergers and acquisitions completed between January 1, 
1990 and December 31, 2015. In our sample we exclude spin-outs, recapitalizations, 
privatizations, and share repurchases. The sample excludes firms in the utilities and financial 
sectors as is consistent with prior studies. For clarity, the purpose for excluding these two sectors 
is primarily related to the historically regulated nature of their industries, both historically as 
well as the dramatic regulatory changes that occurred during our sample period.19 Further, we 
anticipate the deregulation or liberalization that began in the US utilities industry in the early 
1990s, and in the European Union in the mid to late 1990s would have an impact on the volume 
of M&A transactions. We expect the exploration of these structural policy changes to be the 
subject of other studies. An example of one such study is Kenessey (2013) who finds that 
deregulation is an important explanatory variable in determining the volume of cross-border 
M&A transactions that occurred in the European energy marketplace between 1990 and 2007.  
[Insert Table 1: Observations and Average Premium across Countries] 
Similar to Rossi and Volpin (2004), we are primarily concerned with transactions that 
involve a change of control because we want to assess the premium paid for potential synergies 
to the combined entity, and as such we exclude deals where the acquirer purchases less than 
50.1% of the target’s shares. As Rossi and Volpin (2004) point out, the quality and availability 
of data varies (in some cases quite substantially) across countries and over time. Particularly 
with poorer/smaller countries, there is a lag effect in terms of the data collection methods and 
                                            
16 The original sample includes 9,244 observations, 7,292 of which have missing or negative premium data 
17 SDC Platinum is provided by Thomson Reuters and is a primary source of M&A data for financial studies 
18 La Porta’s datasets can be found at his website http://faculty.tuck.dartmouth.edu/rafael-laporta/research-publications/; for a 
summary of the variables used in this study please see the Appendix 
19 The regulation and changes to regulations that occurred over time have had meaningful implications for M&A, capital 
structure, dividend policies, and risk and return characteristics 
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over time that data quality tends to improve. We address this issue by replicating our study for 
transactions announced after December 31, 1999 and find very similar results (See Table 9 in 
the Appendix) 
As expected, our deal premium data is highly concentrated between 0% and 75% with more 
than 85% of the observations falling between those values. The average premium for the entire 
dataset is ~46.7% and can fluctuate up or down by more than 20% (standard deviation of ~7.8%). 
By computing the three year rolling average annual premium, we can identify premium trends 
over time. In Figure 4 and Figure 5 below, we observe that the premium trends seem to be 
inversely related to M&A activity, particularly during the most recent waves.  
[Insert Figure 2: Sample Premium Histogram] 
[Insert Figure 3: Average Annual Premium Paid in Sample] 
[Insert Figure 4: Three Year Rolling Average Annual Premium] 
[Insert Figure 5: Annual Global Cross-Border M&A Value vs. Merger Premiums] 
[Insert Figure 6: Premium Range and Measures of Central Tendency] 
As mentioned, the country-level variables used in this study are provided primarily by Rafael 
La Porta and can be found at the website located in footnote 18 on the previous page. This dataset 
is commonly used in academic research that focuses on differences in country-level 
characteristics, as well as that literature which discusses the topics of the relations between law 
and finance. La Porta et al. (1998) develop an index called the anti-director rights index that was 
used as a measure of shareholder protection. The anti-director rights index was used in over 100 
articles since its introduction in 1998 (Spamann, 2008).20 The anti-director rights index is 
measured from 0 to 6 and constructed by adding one each time a country implements a specific 
measure of shareholder rights, including: (1) the ability to vote by mail, (2) whether or not there 
is a requirement to deposit your shares prior to a General Shareholders Meeting, (3) whether or 
not there is minority investor representation on the Board, (4) whether or not there is an 
oppressed minorities mechanism in the event of obvious expropriation, (5) whether or not all 
                                            
20 Spamann (2009) criticizes the accuracy and merits of the anti-director rights index and suggests revisions for the majority of 
countries analyzed. The study finds that many of the key findings are not supported using the revised values.  
  19   
 
shareholders have the right to purchase additional shares on the same terms as management, and 
(6) whether or not there is a mandatory dividend rule. Some of the central findings of the anti-
director rights index were that better investor protection is associated with broader and deeper 
capital markets (La Porta et al., 1997), that common law countries provide better protection to 
minority investors than civil law countries (La Porta et al., 1998), and that better investor 
protection leads to less ownership concentration for firms listed on a country’s stock market. By 
pioneering the quantification of legal rules, the authors had created a groundbreaking innovation. 
In response to criticisms based on the ad hoc nature of the anti-director rights index and the 
methods used to collect data, Djankov et al., (2008) construct a new index to address the strength 
of minority investor protection against self-dealing by controlling shareholders that is better 
grounded in theory. This index is created with the help of Lex Mundi law firms and assesses the 
difficulty or “hurdles” that an insider must jump in order to get away with self-dealing, the higher 
the hurdles, the higher is the anti-self-dealing index. Importantly, as Djankov et al. (2008) states, 
a possible limitation of the anti-self-dealing index methodology is that the law on the books does 
not necessarily reflect the true legal environment. Encouraged by the innovative approaches of 
La Porta et al. (1998) and Djankov et al. (2008), we endeavor to address this issue by creating 
our own index, using principal component analysis. Our index encompasses several measures of 
legal and regulatory protection and corporate governance across countries. We intend to use our 
index to explain differences in premiums paid to effectuate cross-border M&A transactions.   
Despite the fact we believe the investment environment index to be a strong proxy for 
country-level investment characteristics, there are undoubtedly other important country-level 
variables that we do not consider. For example, Rossi and Volpin (2004) find countries that have 
the same official language, are in the same geographic area, and countries that have higher 
bilateral trade are important motives for cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Similarly, Stulz 
and Williamson (2001) find openness, culture and religion, at the country-level, play an 
important role predicting how countries enforce certain financial rights. And, because our study 
is principally focused on studying the effects of legal, regulatory and corporate governance 
standards, we do not included these variables in our work.  
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4. Research Methodology 
Our study uses cross-sectional data to explore the country-level determinants of cross-border 
M&A premiums. As previously discussed, many country-level characteristics are highly 
correlated. The highly correlated nature of these variables (such as rule of law, accounting 
standards, ability to enforce contracts, investor protection, judicial efficiency, and risk of 
expropriation) causes empirical issues. The principal issue is that highly correlated independent 
variables can cause estimation problems. To quote Peter Kennedy, “Although the estimation 
procedure does not break down when the independent variables are highly correlated (i.e. 
approximately linearly related), severe estimation problems arise” (Kennedy, 2001, pp. 183). 
Highly correlated independent variables leads to multicollinearity which in turn leads to large 
variances in the ordinary least squares (“OLS”) estimates of the parameters. Or put another way, 
there is simply not enough independent variation among the variables for the OLS procedure to 
confidently estimate the impact of each independent variable on the dependent variable.  
[Insert Table 2: Correlation Matrix] 
There are two ways to deal with the issue of multicollinearity arising from highly correlated 
variables. The first option is to do nothing. The presence of multicollinearity in a dataset does 
not necessarily mean the variance of the estimated coefficients are unacceptably high (Kennedy, 
2001, pp. 187). As we can see from our results in Table 4, using this option and including all the 
variables in a regression without making any adjustments yields weak results. The option of 
inaction is not our first choice and despite some situations where it may be acceptable, we do 
not use this approach in our study. The second option is to incorporate additional data. However, 
incorporating additional information is relatively vague and there are several methods by which 
to do this, including: obtaining more data, formalizing the relations among variables, dropping 
one or some variables, or forming a principal component (Kennedy, 2001, pp. 189). In this study 
we focus on forming a principal component. By forming a principal component, the highly 
correlated variables can be combined into a composite index that represents the entire group of 
underlying variables. In our study we keep only the first principal component, which is formed 
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by weighting each variable so that the newly created composite index maximizes the total 
possible variation from the underlying variables.21,22  
 
The variables we combine are as follows:  
(1) Accounting Standards  
(2) Judicial Efficiency 
(3) Risk of Contract Repudiation  
(4) Risk of Expropriation  
(5) Common Law dummy variable  
 
We combine these variables because theory and practice yield convincing arguments that 
management (and investors) consider the effect these variables have on their ability to realize 
the estimated synergies associated with the transaction. Although we previously discussed the 
anti-director rights index and the anti-self-dealing index in detail, we do not include these 
variables in our composite index. The reason for this is twofold. The first is that the managers of 
the acquiring firm are not going to be minority shareholders of the combined firm and as a result, 
they will not be as concerned about minority shareholder rights. The second reason is, as Rossi 
and Volpin (2004) point out, that target firms typically adopt the governance standards of the 
acquirers. And so, while it may be true that management of the acquiring firm is partial to self-
dealing transactions, they will almost always still be governed by the same standards as they 
were prior to the transaction. We contend that by combining the five variables listed above we 
will achieve a good proxy for the investment environment in which an acquiring firm is pursuing 
an acquisition. We further contend that by combining these variables we are adequately 
capturing some of the risks associated with forced expropriation, contract repudiation, lack of 
structure and efficiency (and even outright corruption) in the judicial system, and corporate 
                                            
21 As Kennedy suggests in A Guide to Econometrics, the most common way to employ principal component analysis is to use 
only the first component of the variables 
22 The first principal component accounts for approximately 55% of the total variance in the underlying variables 
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disclosure requirements. It is for these reasons that we expect this newly created index variable 
to be strongly and positively correlated with cross-border merger premiums.  
[Insert Table 3: Variable Summary Statistics] 
 
4.1 Estimation Methods 
To begin, our study uses an OLS model to analyze the country-level determinants of M&A 
premiums while controlling for various deal and firm-level characteristics. Similar to Rossi and 
Volpin (2004), we will use the following model specifications to analyze the data: 
(1) ln(Premium) = αi + β1ln(Target Sizej) + β2(Ownershipj) + β3Xi + ε 
 
(2) ln(Premium) = αi + β1(Investment Environmenti) + β2ln(Target Sizej) + 
β3(Ownershipj) + β4Z+ ε 
In Equation (1) we will analyze how each input variable for the investment environment will 
affect the merger premium on a standalone basis. In equation (1), X represents the individual 
country-level indices that make up the investment environment. In Equation (2) we will include 
the investment environment index in our regression and control for other firm-level and deal-
level characteristics represented by Z.  
Dependent variable: Premium 
 The Premium is the ratio of the takeover offer to the target’s closing price four weeks prior 
to announcement of the transaction. The calculating of this variable is consistent with prior 
premium related literature (Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Sonenshine and Reynolds, 2013). Premiums 
are known to be noisy by nature and the decision to use the stock price four weeks prior to 
announcement in the denominator is an attempt at observing an unaffected stock price. Table 1 
provides evidence of the information leakage that occurs over the 4 week period leading up to 
announcement of the transaction. With that said, we do provide a robustness test in Table 6 to 
confirm our findings.  
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Test variable: Investment Environment 
The Investment Environment is measured as the first principal component of the common 
law dummy variable, the accounting standards index, the risk of contract repudiation, the risk of 
expropriation index, and the judicial efficiency index.  
 
Control Variables: Size, Ownership 
The Target Size is measured as the total assets of the target firm (in US$MM). This figure 
is measured as of the most recent quarterly results prior to transaction announcement.  
The Ownership variable is measured as the proportion of total shares outstanding that was 
acquired. Since we are only interested in transactions where the acquirer purchases a controlling 
stake in the target, we restrict the data to a range between 50.1% and 100%. 
 
Additional Control Variables:  
In multiple regressions we control for various other factors that may impact the explanatory 
power of our investment environment composite index. Other variables that we control for and 
their expected sign are outlined in the table below: 
(1) GDP Growth: the natural logarithm of average annual GDP per capita growth (+) 
(2) Horizontal: dummy variable that equals 1 if the target and the acquirer are in the same 
industry, and zero otherwise (+) 
(3) Glamour Firm: the current market valuation of the firm as measured by the log of the 
price to earnings ratio measured four weeks prior to announcement (+)  
(4) Challenge: dummy variable that equals 1 if the deal was challenged and 0 otherwise (+) 
(5) US or UK Target: dummy variables that equals 1 if the target is located in the US or the 
UK, and zero otherwise (+) 
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5. Empirical Results 
As a first step, we begin by running a regression analysis using the variables we use to 
compose our investment environment index. The standard errors are shown in parentheses and 
are adjusted for heteroscedasticity using the Huber (1967) and White (1980) corrections. The 
regression results are shown Table 4 below and each column is used to measure the relation 
between one principal component input variable and the premium while also controlling for size, 
ownership percentage, and fixed effects for year and industry. In column 6 we include all the 
variables that will be used to create our investment environment index.  
Column 1 measures the relation between the common law dummy variable proposed by La 
Porta et al. (1998) and find it is positively correlated with the premium. Indicating that common 
law countries on average command premiums that are 7.8% higher than civil law countries. 
Similar to La Porta et al. (2002), it is possible this result is driven by the unbalanced nature of 
our sample, which includes approximately 78% of observations owing to common law legal 
origins. In column 2 we drop the common law variable and include accounting standards. As 
anticipated the coefficient is positive, although contrary to expectation it is insignificant. One 
plausible explanation for this finding is that throughout the M&A process, the acquirer will 
conduct comprehensive financial due diligence and have access to very detailed information 
allowing them to assess the financial accuracy of the business without relying on external 
financial statements. If this explanation is true, we should expect accounting standards to be a 
more useful predictor of merger volume rather than merger premium, as Rossi and Volpin (2004) 
find.23 With that being said, we note that accounting standards appears to have better explanatory 
power than common law, contract risk, or the risk of expropriation. Column 3 drops the 
accounting standards index and includes the risk of contract repudiation index, which has a 
positive relation with the premium paid, but again is insignificant. Column 4 replaces the risk of 
contract repudiation index with the risk of expropriation index. The coefficient is positive and 
significant at the 10% level, indicating that acquirers will pay a higher premium when there is 
less risk of forced expropriation by government. In column 5 we substitute the risk of 
                                            
23 Note that the acquirer would not likely have access to in-depth financial materials in the event of a hostile takeover. Rossi and 
Volpin (2004) find that better accounting standards are positively and significantly correlated with increased incidence of hostile 
takeovers which we interpret as acquirers having enough high quality accounting information to adequately de-risk the 
acquisition without the need for comprehensive in-depth financial diligence that may be required in a country with weaker 
accounting standards.  
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expropriation index for the judicial efficiency index, which can be thought of as the ability to 
enforce the judicial rulings as it affects business, and in particular foreign firms (La Porta et al., 
1998). The judicial efficiency index is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. In 
column 6 we include all the key variables in columns 1 through 5 and find only the judicial 
efficiency index remains positive and statistically significant, albeit at the 5% level. Despite the 
weakly significant results in this table, theory and intuition tell us that investors ascribe value to 
investments when they feel their capital is better protected and they are better able to understand 
the risks associated with the investment.   
[Insert Table 4: Regression results with input variables] 
In Table 5 we include our investment environment index, the first principal component of 
the five key variables in Table 3, in all our regressions. Our results find a positive and significant 
relation between the investment environment index and cross-border M&A premiums, providing 
meaningful support for our hypothesis. We test the robustness of this finding by running multiple 
specifications with various additional control variables. In each column we control for the size 
of the target firm (which we would expect to be negatively related to the premium), and the 
percentage of the target firm’s outstanding shares that are purchased in the transaction (which 
we would expect to be positively related to the premium), as well controlling for year and 
industry fixed effects.24, 25  
In column 1 we show basic controls including target size and ownership. All of the signs are 
as anticipated and each variable is significant at the 1% level. Our results suggest that, on 
average, a one standard deviation increase in the investment environment index (a material 
change representing the approximate difference between a target in Malaysia (Rank 22/41) and 
a target in the United Kingdom (Rank 1/41)) correlates with a 19.3% increase in the merger 
premium. Column 2 includes controls for the natural logarithm of the average GDP per capita 
growth over the study time horizon and a dummy variable that is 1 if the acquirer is pursuing a 
horizontal merger, as measured at the two SIC digit level.26 As we would expect, both variables 
                                            
24 Moeller et al. (2004) find that there is a negative relation between takeover premiums and the size of the target (as measured 
by the natural logarithm of the equity value) 
25 Sonenshine and Reynolds (2013) find a positive relation between the takeover premium and the percentage of target firm 
shares acquired  
26 Both approaches are common in the precedent literature; see Wurgler (2000) and Weiner (2005) respectively 
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are positively related to merger premiums, but interestingly neither is significant. It is possible 
that as a result of the averaging methodology and the lengthy time horizon for the study we lose 
some of the effect of GDP per capita growth on merger premiums.27 As it relates to acquiring 
targets in a related industry, our finding of insignificance is consistent with Datta and Puia (1995) 
and Sonenshine and Reynolds (2013) but contradicts the findings of Markedes and Ittner (1994) 
and Marr et al. (2006) who find a positive impact on shareholder value but also find the 
coefficient is significant. In column 3 we include a control variable for the target’s market 
valuation as measured by its price-to-earnings ratio 4 weeks prior to announcement of the 
transaction. The result is a positive and significant coefficient which may seem counter-intuitive 
at first, however, it is consistent with both the Hubris Hypothesis proposed by Roll (1986), as 
well as Hayward and Hambrick (1995) who show that past managerial performance is associated 
with higher takeover premiums. Roll’s (1986) Hubris Hypothesis suggests that the acquiring 
firm’s management can suffer from hubris and meaningfully overestimate their ability to create 
value and achieve synergies and, as a result, overpay for targets. In column 4 we control for deals 
in which the initial acquisition announcement was met with a competing bid from another 
acquirer. As we would expect the coefficient is positive and significant. The increased 
competition for the target leads each prospective acquiring firm to try and outbid the other, 
resulting in a higher premium. In column 5 we include all the previously included control 
variables and find that our investment environment index remains significant at the 1% level. In 
column 6, we follow the example of Rossi and Volpin (2004) and include a dummy variable if 
the targets are located in the UK or the US. Since there are 605 observations where the target is 
located in the US (representing approximately 32% of our sample) and 291 observations where 
the target is located in the UK (representing approximately 16% of our sample), we want to 
ensure our results are not being driven by the US and UK investment environments. We also 
drop the GDP per capita growth and the horizontal merger variables as they proved to be 
insignificant. Unlike Rossi and Volpin (2004) who find their main investor protection variable 
is no longer significant when they include US and UK dummies, we find our investment 
environment index remains positive and significant. We also find that the coefficients on US and 
UK dummy variables are positive, but insignificant. We interpret that to mean our results are not 
                                            
27 We use a country’s average GDP growth per capita over the sample period as a proxy for country-level GDP growth. Despite 
the obvious limitation of this methodology, we do not investigate the issue further as we would not expect GDP growth to change 
the relation between the investment environment index and merger premiums 
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being driven by US and UK targets; rather our investment environment index is positively and 
significantly related to cross-border merger premiums. Despite the slight loss of significance, we 
find a one standard deviation increase in the investment environment index (a material change 
representing the approximate difference between a target in Malaysia (Rank 22/41) and a target 
in the United Kingdom (Rank 1/41)) correlates with a 16.3% increase in the merger premium. 
These findings support our hypothesis and lead us to have confidence that a country’s legal and 
regulatory investment characteristics are positively related to the premium paid in cross-border 
M&A. 
[Insert Table 5: Investment Environment Index] 
5.1 Additional Robustness Test 
To evaluate the robustness of our results, we repeat our analyses using premium as measured 
by the takeover offer to the target’s closing price one day prior to announcement of the 
transaction. We note that our sample was designed to provide the maximum number of 
observations for premiums four weeks prior to announcement and as such we have fewer 
observations for premiums one day prior to announcement. Despite this, we find that our results 
are very similar to our primary results. Schwert (1996) studies the relation between takeover 
premiums and the pre-announcement stock price run-ups that are commonly observed ahead of 
M&A transaction announcements and finds that the merger premium is determined based on the 
market price the day before the first bid, that is, the pre-announcement run-up does not generally 
matter. This finding suggests that the run-up in share price represents a future cost to the bidder 
as they do not adjust their takeover premium accordingly. If this were the case then we would 
expect the coefficients on our variables as well as the sign and significance to be relatively 
unchanged as time draws nearer to the transaction announcement date, which is consistent with 
our findings. 
[Insert Table 6: Robustness Results] 
In column 1 we again find there is a positive relation between the investment environment 
index and cross-border merger premiums. Target size remains negative and significant while 
ownership remains positive but is no longer significant. Column 2 includes GDP per capita 
growth rate and a dummy variable for mergers in the same industry. Interestingly, in this 
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regression we find a positive and significant coefficient for mergers in the same industry. As in 
Table 4, Column 3 controls for the target’s market valuation, as measured by the price-to-
earnings ratio and again we find a positive and significant association, indicating past investors 
will pay for past performance and higher implied growth. We observe the coefficient for target 
size loses significance in this regression, as well as a small loss of significance on the investment 
environment index to the 5% level. In column 4 we include the challenged deal flag and again 
find a positive and significant relation. Column 5 controls for GDP per capita growth, mergers 
from the same industry, the targets market valuation, and the challenged deal flag. Our 
investment environment index remains significant at 5% and we lose significance on the target 
size coefficient. In column 6 we again include a dummy variable for US and UK targets and find 
the coefficient is positive and significant at the 5% level. We also observe that we lose 
significance on our investment environment index which we interpret as our results being driven 
by US and UK M&A premiums. This result is consistent with the findings Rossi and Volpin 
(2004) who find their key country-level variable becomes an insignificant predictor of premiums 
when they control for US and UK firms. Interestingly, in this series of regressions the percentage 
of ownership acquired is only weakly significant in columns 3 and 5 and not significant in 
columns 1, 2, and 6.  
As we discussed earlier in the paper, a country’s legal origin is truly exogenous by definition. 
An argument could be made that the inclusion of the common law dummy variable in the 
investment environment index is driving our results. To test this argument, we run the same OLS 
regression analysis, however we exclude the common law dummy variable in the construction 
of the principal component.28  
[Insert Table 7: Additional Robustness Results] 
[Insert Table 8: Additional Robustness Results] 
In Table 7 we observe the results are very similar to our primary empirical results of Table 
5 indicating that a country’s legal origins are not disproportionately driving our results. Despite 
the apparently lack of contribution from the common law dummy variable to the results, we 
                                            
28 The revised principal component includes Accounting Standards, Judicial Efficacy, Risk of Contract Repudiation, and Risk 
of Expropriation 
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believe it is an important consideration for the acquiring firm’s management when making an 
acquisition decision. To test this relation, between the common law dummy variable and cross-
border M&A premiums, we perform an additional regression excluding the investment 
environment index entirely. We find the effect of the common law dummy variable to be of only 
minor importance in explaining cross-border M&A premiums. Interestingly however, in column 
7 we find the dummy variable for US or UK targets to be positive and statistically significant at 
the 10% level, while these countries represent approximately 61% – the lions share – of the 
common law observations. The implication of these findings is that although we believe the 
target country’s legal system to play a critical role when acquiring firm’s managers contemplate 
an acquisition, the legal system is largely assessed by other, perhaps more specific, measures – 
such as the judicial efficiency, the risk of expropriation, or the risk of contract repudiation.   
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6. Conclusion 
It is argued that the market for corporate control is a substitute for an effective legal and 
regulatory system that protects shareholders from expropriation (Manne, 1965; Jensen, 1993).  
However, our findings suggest that a formal legal and regulatory environment that reduces risk 
and increases transparency may foster a more conducive environment for changes in corporate 
control to occur (Coffee, 1999; Rossi and Volpin, 2004). Additionally, when the investment 
environment is systematically more favorable, foreign investors are willing to pay higher 
premiums to acquire target firms. Simply put, our results indicate that a country’s investment 
environment has a meaningful impact on corporate valuations. We suggest our findings can be 
interpreted as foreign buyers having more confidence in the target’s merits as an investment as 
a result of the reduced risk attributable to the enhanced investment environment. The investment 
environment in this case being measured by the legal and regulatory framework, investor 
protection, and disclosure requirements. All things equal, investors are prepared to part with 
more of their capital when they feel confident that the risk of expropriation is lower. Further, 
investors are again inclined to part with more of their capital if they feel that they have legitimate 
recourse in the event they are treated unfairly or fraudulently mislead. And finally, investors will 
part with more of their capital when they believe they are well informed and the risk of 
purchasing a lemon is lower.  
By using principal component analysis to construct a new measure of a country’s investment 
environment, our study was able to address the empirical issue of collinearity across country-
level variables. We were also able to demonstrate that acquirers are aware of, and concerned 
about, a country’s investment environment as it relates to their ability to protect and grow their 
capital within the existing legal and regulatory framework of the target country. Our paper puts 
forth additional evidence to support the compelling argument for improved legal and regulatory 
standards, transparency, and investor protection across countries.  
With that being said, our findings are certainly not without limitations. A central piece of our 
story is that globalization is driving increased cross-border M&A transactions, which intuitively 
implies the global marketplace is changing over time. Our investment environment variable 
however, is composed of several static measurements representing the investment characteristics 
of each country at a certain point in time. The implication here is that our investment 
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environment variable does not account for the changes that occur at each country over time. One 
possible way to combat this issue is to use panel data to measure the changes in country-level 
characteristics over time. Kenessey (2013) uses panel data for 22 European countries for the 
period of 1990 to 2007. The study finds that the difference in acquirer and target accounting 
disclosure and investor protection measures are positive and significantly related to M&A 
activity. A further limitation to our study is that, despite the useful nature of the measures for 
country-level investment characteristics (such as judicial efficiency, risk of expropriation, etc.), 
these are proxy indices remain far from perfect. We explain this issue with a logical and rational 
argument. Although we are using these proxies to measure the underlying country-level 
investment characteristics, we do not practically anticipate that the acquirer’s management 
would base their merger premium on, for example, the risk of expropriation index (nor our 
investment environment index for that matter). We simply argue that the scope of the acquirer’s 
pre-transaction due diligence is not limited to one variable, but rather a broader investment 
environment that is comprised of several interrelated institutional forces. We aim to provide only 
one new perspective on how management may be thinking about merger premiums in the context 
of cross-border M&A transactions.  
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Appendix 
Definition of Variables – Country-Level Variables 
Common Law Equals one if the origin of the country’s law is 
English Common Law, otherwise zero  
Source: La Porta et al. (1998) 
Accounting Standards Index created by the Center for International 
Financial Analysis and Research to rank the 
quality of disclosure in annual reports in the 
year 1990; a minimum of 3 companies were 
studied in each country 
Source: La Porta et al. (1998) 
Risk of Contract Repudiation 
(Contract Risk) 
ICR’s assessment of the risk of a modification 
in a contract taking the form of a repudiation, 
postponement, or scaling down due to budget 
cutbacks, indigenization pressure, change in 
government, or a change in government 
priorities. Scale of 0 to 10 with lower scores 
indicating higher risks.  
Source: La Porta et al. (1998) 
Risk of Expropriation  
(Expropriation) 
ICR’s assessment of the risk of outright 
confiscation or forced nationalization between 
the years 1982 and 1995. On a scale of zero to 
10 with lower scores indicating higher risk 
Source: La Porta et al. (1998) 
Judicial Efficiency 
(Enforcement) 
Assessment of the efficiency and integrity of the 
legal environment as it affects business, 
particularly foreign firms, produced by 
Business International Corp. Scale of zero to 10 
with lower scores indicating lower levels of 
efficiency 
Source: La Porta et al. (1998) 
Investment Environment Index created for this paper using the first 
principal component of the following five 
variables: (1) common law, (2) accounting 
standards, (3) contract risk, (4) risk of 
expropriation, and (5) judicial efficiency 
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Definition of Variables – Other Variables 
Premium Bid price as a percentage of the closing price of the 
target four weeks prior to the transaction 
announcement 
Source: SDC Platinum 
Target Size  Logarithm of the target company’s total assets as 
at the most recent quarter end in US$ millions 
Source: SDC Platinum 
Ownership The percentage of the target’s basic shares 
outstanding acquired by the purchaser 
Source: SDC Platinum 
Challenged Equals one if the number of bidders is greater than 
one and zero otherwise 
Source: SDC Platinum 
Horizontal Equals one if the SIC codes of the target and the 
acquirer match at the two digit level and zero 
otherwise 
Source: SDC Platinum 
Glamour Firm The ratio of the price to earnings of the target 
company prior to the transaction announcement 
Source: SDC Platinum 
GDP Growth The target country’s average GDP per capita 
growth rate between 1990 and 2015 
Source: World Bank Dataset 
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Table 1: Observations and Average Premium by Country 
 This table provides the number of observations, proportion of total observations, average 
premium four weeks prior and one day prior, as well as the change in premium over that time 
period. 
 
Number of % of Average Premium
Country Obs. Total 4 Weeks 1 Day ∆ 4W / 1D
Argentina 1 0.1% 41.7% 31.3%  (10.4%)
Australia 154 8.2% 44.1% 37.1%  (7.0%)
Austria 8 0.4% 44.1% 53.7% 9.6%
Belgium 16 0.9% 56.3% 46.0%  (10.3%)
Brazil 4 0.2% 44.8% 37.5%  (7.4%)
Canada 268 14.3% 43.4% 34.7%  (8.8%)
Chile 7 0.4% 34.5% 24.9%  (9.7%)
Colombia 1 0.1% 34.1% 19.5%  (14.6%)
Denmark 17 0.9% 40.7% 33.0%  (7.8%)
Egypt 3 0.2% 71.5% 33.7%  (37.8%)
Finland 17 0.9% 40.8% 44.0% 3.1%
France 62 3.3% 35.3% 28.9%  (6.4%)
Germany 29 1.6% 33.4% 27.3%  (6.1%)
Greece 9 0.5% 19.9% 20.6% 0.7%
Hong Kong 20 1.1% 43.0% 31.0%  (12.0%)
India 6 0.3% 35.3% 18.0%  (17.3%)
Indonesia 7 0.4% 12.6% 5.0%  (7.7%)
Ireland 18 1.0% 58.9% 34.1%  (24.8%)
Israel 24 1.3% 50.2% 34.6%  (15.6%)
Italy 14 0.7% 36.2% 28.7%  (7.5%)
Japan 8 0.4% 28.8% 28.7%  (0.0%)
Malaysia 15 0.8% 54.4% 45.0%  (9.4%)
Netherlands 51 2.7% 43.3% 32.5%  (10.9%)
New Zealand 14 0.7% 44.3% 28.6%  (15.7%)
Nigeria 1 0.1% 124.6% 100.4%  (24.2%)
Norway 40 2.1% 46.4% 39.0%  (7.4%)
Pakistan 1 0.1% 85.8% 35.4%  (50.3%)
Peru 1 0.1% 33.0% 30.1%  (2.9%)
Philippines 3 0.2% 38.4% 37.5%  (1.0%)
Portugal 1 0.1% 32.9% 43.1% 10.2%
Singapore 31 1.7% 37.3% 22.5%  (14.8%)
South Africa 17 0.9% 32.8% 30.8%  (2.0%)
South Korea 6 0.3% 39.0% 30.2%  (8.7%)
Spain 10 0.5% 40.5% 30.3%  (10.2%)
Sweden 53 2.8% 46.8% 33.1%  (13.7%)
Switzerland 24 1.3% 36.7% 28.8%  (7.9%)
Taiwan 8 0.4% 27.3% 17.8%  (9.5%)
Thailand 4 0.2% 41.2% 33.5%  (7.7%)
Turkey 1 0.1% 23.5% 31.6% 8.2%
United Kingdom 291 15.6% 50.4% 42.2%  (8.2%)
United States 605 32.4% 48.9% 37.4%  (11.6%)
Total 1,870 100.0%
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Table 2: Pearson Correlation Matrix 
This table reports the Pearson correlations across the variables used to create our 
investment environment index. The correlations are based on an unbalanced data set of 63 
countries from January 1, 1990 through December 31, 2015. We find that all pairwise 
correlations are significant at the 1% level.  
  
Common Accounting Risk of Judicial Risk of Contract
Law Standards Expropriation Efficiency Repudiation
Common Law Dummy 1
–
Accounting Standards 0.2512*** 1
(0.0000) –
Risk of Expropriation 0.1423*** 0.2607*** 1
(0.0000) (0.0000) –
Judicial Efficiency 0.3685*** 0.4834*** 0.6505*** 1
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) –
Risk of Contract Repudiation -0.0819*** 0.3822*** 0.7988*** 0.5830*** 1
(0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) –
p-Values in parantheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 3: Variable Summary Statistics 
This table presents the summary statistics of the major dependent and independent 
variables. The primary dependent variable, Premium is measured by the ratio of the offer price 
relative to the unaffected trading price four weeks prior to the transaction announcement. In our 
regressions we adjust several of these variables using natural logarithms including: the target 
size, the ownership percentage, and the GDP per capita growth rate.  
 
 
  
85
Mean SD Min Max N
Premium
Premium (4 Weeks) % 45.8 31.5 0 175 1,870
Premium (1 Day) % 36.2 28.8 0 173 1,815
Firm-level Variables
Target Size (Total Assets) US$MM 1,188 5,441 10 184,135 1,870
Glamour Firm x 53.4 172.4 0.1 3,353.3 1,305
Deal-level Variables
Ownership % 92.8 13.9 50.1 100.0 1,870
Challenge y/n 0.084 0.277 0 1 1,870
Horizontal y/n 0.518 0.500 0 1 1,870
Transaction Value US$MM 1,441 4,410 25 74,559 1,870
Country-level Variables
Common Law score 0.786 0.411 0 1 1,870
Accounting Standards score 6.093 1.340 2.4 8.3 1,869
Judicial Efficiency score 7.667 2.051 2.5 10.0 1,870
Risk of Expropriation score 8.050 1.588 5.2 10.0 1,870
Risk of Contract Repudiation score 7.580 1.785 4.4 10.0 1,870
Investment Environment component -3.326 3.812 -11.2 1.2 1,869
GDP Growth % 1.562 0.603 0.4 4.7 1,862
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Table 4: OLS Regression of PCA Input Variables on Merger Premium  
(Four Weeks Prior to Announcement) 
 This table presents the results of the regression analysis that includes the input variables 
used to create the principal component index.  
  
Premium Four Weeks Prior to Transaction Announcement
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Target Size -0.0582*** -0.0573*** -0.0598*** -0.0609*** -0.0591*** -0.0581***
 (0.0116)  (0.0118)  (0.0117)  (0.0117)  (0.0116)  (0.0118)
Ownership 0.00750*** 0.00818*** 0.00790*** 0.00740*** 0.00681*** 0.00671***
 (0.0017)  (0.0016)  (0.0016)  (0.0017)  (0.0017)  (0.0017)
Common Law 0.0996** 0.0354
 (0.0502)  (0.0597)
Acounting Standards 0.0415 0.00686
 (0.0271)  (0.0297)
Risk of Contract 0.0580 -0.00173
Repudiation  (0.0390)  (0.0623)
Risk of Expropriation 0.0747* 0.0112
 (0.0413)  (0.0633)
Judicial Efficiency 0.0803*** 0.0728** 
 (0.0250)  (0.0331)
Constant            3.135*** 2.897*** 2.687*** 2.541*** 2.578*** 2.483***
 (0.3760)  (0.4260)  (0.5270)  (0.5340)  (0.4150)  (0.5280)
Number of Observations 1864 1863 1864 1864 1864 1863
Adjusted R-Squared 0.0716 0.0726 0.0713 0.0722 0.0776 0.0774
AIC 4511.7 4507.1 4512.2 4510.3 4499.5 4501.2
F-Statistic 4.7600 4.7700 4.6980 4.7080 4.8820 4.4770
Degrees of Freedom 1827 1826 1827 1827 1827 1822
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 5: OLS Regression of Investment Environment Index on Merger Premiums 
(Four Weeks Prior to Announcement) 
This table presents the main findings. We regress the investment environment index and 
several control variables on cross-border merger premiums and find evidence that cross-border 
merger premiums can be, at least partially, explained by a country’s investment environment.  
  
Premium Four Weeks Prior to Transaction Announcement
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Investment Environment 0.0465*** 0.0485*** 0.0463*** 0.0455*** 0.0461*** 0.0397** 
 (0.0164)  (0.0164)  (0.0174)  (0.0163)  (0.0173)  (0.0191)
Target Size              -0.0588*** -0.0591*** -0.0400*** -0.0620*** -0.0423*** -0.0447***
 (0.0117)  (0.0116)  (0.0142)  (0.0116)  (0.0141)  (0.0145)
Ownership         0.00704*** 0.00707*** 0.00773*** 0.00688*** 0.00780*** 0.00743***
 (0.0017)  (0.0017)  (0.0020)  (0.0017)  (0.0019)  (0.0020)
GDP Growth 0.098 0.0825                
 (0.0816)  (0.0913)                
Horizontal 0.0487 -0.00998                
 (0.0385)  (0.0445)                
Glamour Firm 0.0768*** 0.0778*** 0.0750***
 (0.0250)  (0.0244)  (0.0246)
Challenged 0.251*** 0.278*** 0.281***
 (0.0727)  (0.0743)  (0.0740)
US or UK Target 0.0482
 (0.0536)
Constant            3.310*** 3.262*** 2.799*** 3.279*** 2.713*** 2.782***
 (0.3400)  (0.3440)  (0.4110)  (0.3260)  (0.4040)  (0.4060)
Number of Observations 1863 1855 1300 1863 1292 1300
Adjusted R-Squared 0.0772 0.0778 0.0938 0.0835 0.1002 0.1009
AIC 4497.7 4480.3 3108.9 4486.0 3085.3 3100.6
F-Statistic 4.8750 4.7700 4.1970 5.1520 4.2260 4.2840
Degrees of Freedom 1826 1816 1262 1825 1251 1260
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 6: OLS Regression of Investment Environment Index on Merger Premiums  
(One Day Prior to Announcement) 
This table presents the results of the primary robustness check. We test the same 
independent variables but change the dependent variable to be the merger premium as measured 
by the ratio of offer price to share price one day prior to transaction announcement.  
  
Premium One Day Prior to Transaction Announcement
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Investment Environment 0.0598*** 0.0583*** 0.0443** 0.0587*** 0.0429** 0.0238
 (0.0166)  (0.0168)  (0.0180)  (0.0165)  (0.0181)  (0.0193)
Target Size              -0.0376*** -0.0406*** -0.0201 -0.0413*** -0.0281 -0.0301*  
 (0.0141)  (0.0141)  (0.0175)  (0.0141)  (0.0177)  (0.0176)
Ownership         0.00271 0.00255 0.00368* 0.00259 0.00374* 0.0029
 (0.0017)  (0.0017)  (0.0020)  (0.0017)  (0.0020)  (0.0020)
GDP Growth 0.0137 0.0814                
 (0.0879)  (0.1020)                
Horizontal 0.101** 0.0871                
 (0.0470)  (0.0554)                
Glamour Firm 0.102*** 0.100*** 0.0969***
 (0.0260)  (0.0255)  (0.0251)
Challenged 0.248*** 0.326*** 0.343***
 (0.0830)  (0.0922)  (0.0924)
US or UK Target 0.161** 
 (0.0647)
Constant            3.332*** 3.359*** 2.722*** 3.289*** 2.658*** 2.683***
 (0.3300)  (0.3350)  (0.3820)  (0.3210)  (0.3800)  (0.3880)
Number of Observations 1786 1778 1249 1786 1241 1249
Adjusted R-Squared 0.0444 0.0448 0.055 0.0491 0.0628 0.0671
AIC 4826.8 4801.8 3366.7 4819 3333.9 3352.6
F-Statistic 4.135 4.046 3.847 4.437 4.017 4.328
Degrees of Freedom 1749 1739 1211 1748 1200 1209
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 7: OLS Regression of Investment Environment Index Excluding Common Law 
Dummy Variable on Merger Premiums (Four Weeks Prior to Announcement) 
This table presents the results of an additional robustness check. In this test we exclude 
the common law dummy variable in the construction of the principal component that represents 
the investment environment.  
  
Premium Four Weeks Prior to Transaction Announcement
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Investment Environment 
(1)
0.0418** 0.0452*** 0.0442** 0.0409** 0.0455** 0.0387** 
 (0.0167)  (0.0167)  (0.0179)  (0.0166)  (0.0177)  (0.0188)
Common Law 0.0772 0.0528 0.0368 0.0747 0.0161 0.00958
 (0.0505)  (0.0523)  (0.0579)  (0.0503)  (0.0607)  (0.0699)
Target Size              -0.0581*** -0.0589*** -0.0399*** -0.0614*** -0.0424*** -0.0450***
 (0.0116)  (0.0116)  (0.0141)  (0.0116)  (0.0141)  (0.0145)
Ownership         0.00670*** 0.00689*** 0.00765*** 0.00656*** 0.00785*** 0.00748***
 (0.0017)  (0.0017)  (0.0020)  (0.0017)  (0.0020)  (0.0020)
GDP Growth 0.0878 0.0853                
 (0.0842)  (0.0950)                
Horizontal 0.0483 -0.00977                
 (0.0386)  (0.0446)                
Glamour Firm 0.0767*** 0.0778*** 0.0749***
 (0.0250)  (0.0245)  (0.0246)
Challenged 0.250*** 0.278*** 0.282***
 (0.0727)  (0.0743)  (0.0740)
US or UK Target 0.0532
 (0.0628)
Constant            3.265*** 3.235*** 2.773*** 3.235*** 2.694*** 2.769***
 (0.3400)  (0.3440)  (0.4110)  (0.3270)  (0.4050)  (0.4110)
Number of Observations 1863 1855 1300 1863 1292 1300
Adjusted R-Squared 0.0773 0.0774 0.0931 0.0835 0.0994 0.1002
AIC 4498.6 4482.1 3111.0 4487.0 3087.4 3102.7
F-Statistic 4.7730 4.6460 4.0890 5.0360 4.1180 4.1720
Degrees of Freedom 1825 1815 1261 1824 1250 1259
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
(1) Investment Environment does not include Common Law dummy variable in its composition; however, it is included as 
a separate control variable
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Table 8: OLS Regression of Common Law Dummy Variable on Merger Premiums (Four 
Weeks Prior to Announcement) 
This table presents the results of an additional inquiry into the relation between the 
common law dummy variable and cross-border M&A premiums. To get a better understanding 
of this relation, we run a similar regression, however we include only the common law dummy 
variable and exclude the investment environment index.  
  
Premium Four Weeks Prior to Transaction Announcement
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Common Law 0.0996** 0.0845 0.0677 0.0966* 0.0557 0.00574
 (0.0502)  (0.0524)  (0.0574)  (0.0500)  (0.0607)  (0.0702)
Target Size              -0.0582*** -0.0593*** -0.0397*** -0.0615*** -0.0429*** -0.0473***
 (0.0116)  (0.0116)  (0.0141)  (0.0116)  (0.0140)  (0.0144)
Ownership         0.00750*** 0.00762*** 0.00842*** 0.00733*** 0.00851*** 0.00792***
 (0.0017)  (0.0017)  (0.0020)  (0.0017)  (0.0020)  (0.0020)
GDP Growth 0.0401 0.0375                
 (0.0864)  (0.0975)                
Horizontal 0.045 -0.0124                
 (0.0387)  (0.0448)                
Glamour Firm 0.0771*** 0.0775*** 0.0737***
 (0.0251)  (0.0246)  (0.0247)
Challenged 0.253*** 0.283*** 0.292***
 (0.0727)  (0.0737)  (0.0739)
US or UK Target 0.105*  
 (0.0596)
Constant            3.135*** 3.124*** 2.610*** 3.107*** 2.563*** 2.663***
 (0.3760)  (0.3770)  (0.4600)  (0.3620)  (0.4480)  (0.4610)
Number of Observations 1864 1856 1301 1864 1293 1301
Adjusted R-Squared 0.0716 0.0711 0.0849 0.078 0.0909 0.0941
AIC 4511.7 4496.3 3124.4 4499.8 3101.2 3113.1
F-Statistic 4.7600 4.5590 4.0320 5.0250 4.0160 4.1720
Degrees of Freedom 1827 1817 1263 1826 1252 1261
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 9: OLS Regression of Investment Environment Index on Merger Premium 
in sub-sample (1999 - 2015) (Four Weeks Prior to Announcement) 
This table presents our regression results using a truncated sample to test the robustness 
of our findings against improving information quality and changing global market place 
dynamics.  
  
Premium Four Weeks Prior to Transaction Announcement
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Investment Environment 0.0487** 0.0504*** 0.0486** 0.0474** 0.0480** 0.0372*  
 (0.0190)  (0.0190)  (0.0202)  (0.0188)  (0.0201)  (0.0222)
Target Size              -0.0690*** -0.0694*** -0.0517*** -0.0730*** -0.0545*** -0.0599***
 (0.0137)  (0.0136)  (0.0169)  (0.0136)  (0.0168)  (0.0176)
Ownership         0.00682*** 0.00687*** 0.00720*** 0.00658*** 0.00729*** 0.00675***
 (0.0020)  (0.0020)  (0.0023)  (0.0020)  (0.0023)  (0.0023)
GDP Growth 0.0931 0.0857                
 (0.0848)  (0.0953)                
Horizontal 0.0429 -0.0377                
 (0.0455)  (0.0527)                
Glamour Firm 0.0752*** 0.0777*** 0.0723** 
 (0.0289)  (0.0282)  (0.0284)
Challenged 0.317*** 0.307*** 0.314***
 (0.0837)  (0.0923)  (0.0913)
US or UK Target 0.0894
 (0.0624)
Constant            3.208*** 3.154*** 2.622*** 3.156*** 2.531*** 2.640***
 (0.3940)  (0.4000)  (0.4540)  (0.3710)  (0.4440)  (0.4540)
Number of Observations 1404 1396 948 1404 940 948
Adjusted R-Squared 0.0817 0.0821 0.0962 0.0908 0.1038 0.1049
AIC 3459.1 3442.6 2307.4 3446.0 2285.5 2300.2
F-Statistic 5.0160 4.8360 4.1940 5.5100 4.2940 4.3670
Degrees of Freedom 1377 1367 920 1376 909 918
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Figure 1: Historical Domestic and Cross-border M&A Transactions29 
 This figure presents the historical domestic and cross-border M&A transactions between 
1995 and 2015. We can clearly see three distinct M&A waves taking place over the last 20 years, 
and have segmented them based on colored backgrounds. It appears that throughout each wave, 
as overall M&A volume increases, the percentage of cross-border transactions increases as well. 
It also appears that when overall M&A activity is slow, the proportion of cross-border deals is 
also low.  
 
   
                                            
29 Source: dealogic M&A database; includes all M&A greater than US$10MM 
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Figure 2: Sample Premium Histogram 
 This figure presents the frequency of premium observations that fall into each class 
interval as well as the cumulative percentage of total observations. We can see that 
approximately 85% of the observations fall between 0% and 75%, and 38% of the observations 
fall between 25% and 50%.  
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Figure 3: Average Annual Premium Paid in Sample 
 This figure highlights the average annual premium paid in our sample as well as the 
overall average for all transactions. Note that although the average annual premium fluctuates, 
there are not usually large deviations from the mean, which is ~47.1%. 
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Figure 4: Three Year Rolling Average Annual Premium 
 This figure plots the three year rolling average annual premium, the average annual 
merger premium, and the average premium over all years. The purpose of this chart is to 
demonstrate the existing trends related to cross-border merger premiums. The trend appears to 
be that cross-border merger premiums are decreasing over time.  
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Figure 5: Annual Global Cross-Border M&A Value vs. Merger Premiums 
 This figure overlays the three year rolling average annual merger premium and the annual 
merger premium on the total annual cross-border M&A transaction value. We observe that, 
particularly in the most recent two waves, merger premiums tend to be inversely related to 
merger activity.  
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Figure 6: Premium Range and Measures of Central Tendency 
 This figure displays the annual premium range from low to high, as well as the median 
and the average annual premiums. There is significant volatility in the upper bound.  
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